

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
17 November 2016

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2314 (2016), 2235 (2015), 2209 (2015) and 2118 (2013),

Noting that additional allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria are being investigated by the Fact-Finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),

Condemning again in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and *expressing alarm* that civilians continue to be killed and injured by toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law and *reiterating* that those individuals, entities, groups or governments responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,

Reaffirming their grave concern that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with ISIL (Da'esh) or Al-Qaida, including but not limited to foreign terrorist fighters who have joined ISIL (Da'esh) in Syria, groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL (Da'esh), and Al-Nusra Front (ANF), continue operating in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Stressing the need for all Member States to fully comply with their obligations under resolution 2178 (2014),

Recalling that in resolution 2118 the Council underscored that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons and decided that member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violations of resolution 1540 including acquisitions by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore,

1. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, as set out in resolution 2235, for a further period of one year from the date of adoption of this resolution, with a possibility of further extension and update by the Security Council if it deems necessary;



2. *Recalls* its decision that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or, transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;

3. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 1, 3-4, 6, 8, 9, 12, and 15 of resolution 2235;

4. *Encourages* the Joint Investigative Mechanism, where relevant, to consult appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange information on non-State actor perpetration, organization, sponsorship, or other involvement in use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons;

5. *Invites* the Joint Investigative Mechanism to engage relevant regional States in pursuit of its mandate, including in order to identify to the greatest extent feasible any individuals, entities or groups associated with ISIL (Da'esh) or ANF who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, encourages relevant regional states to provide, as appropriate, to the Joint Investigative Mechanism information on non-State actors' access to chemical weapons and their components or efforts by non-State actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use chemical weapons and their means of delivery that occur under their jurisdiction, including relevant information from national investigations, and underscores the importance of States Parties' obligations under Article VII of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), and the full implementation of paragraph 8 of resolution 2235, including with respect to information pertaining to non-State actors;

6. *Recalls* Article X.8 and X.9 of the CWC allowing any State Party to request and receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons if it considers that chemical weapons have been used against it, recalls further that such requests, substantiated by relevant information, are transmitted by the Director General of the OPCW to the Executive Council and all States Parties to the CWC, and invites the Joint Investigative Mechanism to offer its services to the OPCW in such circumstances if relevant to effectively fulfilling the Joint Investigative Mechanism's mandate;

7. *Reaffirms* paragraph 7 of resolution 2235, including with respect to the ability of the Joint Investigative Mechanism to examine additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM but that is related to the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, and stresses the need for its full implementation, in particular the provision of information requested by the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the making available of witnesses;

8. *Requests* the United Nations Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director-General, present a report to the United Nations Security Council and inform the OPCW Executive Council every 60 days on the progress made;

9. *Requests* the Joint Investigative Mechanism to complete a report within 90 days of adoption of this resolution, and complete subsequent reports as appropriate thereafter, and requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism to present the report, or reports, to the United Nations Security Council and inform the OPCW Executive Council, and invites the Joint Investigative Mechanism to brief, as appropriate, the 1540 Committee, the 1267/1989/2253 Committee or other relevant counter-terrorism or non-proliferation bodies on relevant results of their work;

10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
